Introduction
At the heart of European policy for sustainable development and global environmental governance (GEG) lies a vision quite different from that traditionally pursued by sovereign nation-states. Appealing to multilateralism and sustainability, the vision has been selfconsciously promoted as part of the emergent identity of the Union. 1 The European Union pursues an ideal of collective action and actively advances its own model of regional integration. While powerful players like the United States (see Chasek, this volume) or emerging giants like China are opposed to many aspects of international regulation, the EU generally sees its own vision as being in tune with the ethos of the United Nations system itself, despite the fact that it labours under a number of disadvantages in New York, not the least of which is the inferior status of the European Community in an organisation exclusively composed of sovereign states.
Outsiders may well be sceptical, for the Union is no stranger to an aggressive pursuit of trade, agricultural or fisheries interests. Yet there is no necessary contradiction between the promotion of European values, the pursuit of interests and the strong support for a more ambitious agenda of global regulation.
In 2003, a communication from the European Commission reaffirmed Europe's commitment to a multilateral system governed through the United Nations and simultaneously highlighted ways of enhancing the EU's influence. With an implicit attempt to establish a contrasting identity to that of the United States, the EU and the UN were portrayed as holding the fate of the world in their hands:
"In the years ahead, therefore, Europe's attachment to multilateralism -and to the United Nations, as the pivot of the multilateral system -will help determine whether, and how, the institutional architecture established in the years after World War II can continue to serve as the bedrock of the international system. 1 Reference to the debates on European identity and the extent to which it may merely be the reciprocal of military weakness, Kagan (2003) , Rifkin,(2004) Bretherton and Vogler (2006) Ch.2.
The alternative would be devastating -not only in its implications for international peace and security, but also for the wider multilateral agenda, ranging from the follow-up to recent international conferences to the development of a rule-based international trading system" (European Commission 2003: 3) .
The institutional architecture would also include the setting up of the International
Criminal Court and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy as a 'crisis management' capability at the service of the UN, but the focus of this article is the question of global environmental governance (GEG) . Although this has been variously defined -and can be drawn extremely broadly -it is normally seen by the policy community to involve efforts to reform and reintegrate those activities and organisations bearing upon questions of environmental degradation and sustainable development, that come under the very broad umbrella of the United Nations. Thus we might include the various environmental conventions and their autonomous
Conferences of the parties, the WTO, the IMF and IBRD, and numerous other development-related organisations. At the heart of the shifting discussion of sustainable development has been the Rio process, initiated by UNCED in 1992 and followed up by the meetings of its creation, the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD).
Organisationally the key body, set up by the predecessor to UNCED -the Stockholm
Conference of 1972 -has been the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
As a programme, and hence lacking the independence of a specialised agency, UNEP has performed a 'catalytic and co-ordinating' role across a wide range of international environmental activities. The formal debate upon global governance has often converged upon its role and status as well as the linked issue of the creation of an overarching World Environment Organisation (WEO).
In all major global environmental fora, the EU has been one of the few actors to consistently argue in favour of institutional reforms and the speedy and accountable implementation of existing commitments. At times, it has even suggested equipping international institutions with legal powers of compliance monitoring (see ENB 2002: 4) -a proposition that has echoes of the internal role of the European Commission, which regularly holds national governments to account. However, there remains a "disturbing mismatch between aspirations and demands of the EU as an international actor and its relatively limited ability to deliver" (Chaban et al. 2006: 246) . This involves the intractability of the subject matter as well as the internal and institutional problems associated with an actor comprised of 27 sovereign states.
The core arenas of global governance have all built their sometimes fragile legitimacy on a forthright commitment to development. The concept of sustainable development whichdespite its many ambivalent definitions -has provided the theoretical bridge connecting the environment with economy and society has proved a congenial one for the EU with its welldeveloped external aid and environmental policies. Environmental matters received no mention in the Treaty of Rome, but since the 1970s an impressive array of internal legislation has been developed to cope with the environmental effects of the success of economic For now, the priorities of sustainable development remain "far from being at the centre of decision-making in the multilateral system" (Swedish EU Discussion Paper 2001: 2) and, arguably, the prevalent interpretation of sustainable development is substantially tilted towards conventional economic aspects, in particular poverty eradication and economic growth (Von Frantzius 2004) . This situation has been mirrored by some of the internal difficulties and contradictions experienced by the Union and must bear upon its external legitimacy as a leader. There is a record of incoherence between environmental and trade and agricultural policies and although the Union has at least placed environmental considerations on the WTO agenda they have hardly been at the forefront of the objectives of DG Trade and DG Agriculture. In essence, the shifting global agenda has meant that environmental issues have less and less been the subject of separate, sectoral discussions and have instead begun to be integrated with other aspects of global governance, particularly with the global movement for development. 1 As this article will show, the European reaction to this trend has essentially comprised two strategic responses: the EU has, on the one hand, wholeheartedly embraced the ideal of sustainable development and sought to promote it vigorously. At the same time, it has explored ways of strengthening the more focused sector of international environmental governance (IEG) to preserve an autonomous voice for the environment. Though these responses may at first glance appear contradictory, they are better described as complementary. Moreover, the results obtained so far are indicative of the moderate yet measurable impact of European positions in world politics. An analysis of the EU role and positions in the Rio process, at the CSD, and on the question of UNEP reform constitutes the main content of this article, but they must be prefaced by a consideration of the frequent but problematic assumption that the Union is an actor comparable, say, to the United States.
The EU as an actor in global environmental governance
The extent to which the EU may be regarded as an international actor in its own right, comprised as it is of the European Community and 27 Member States, continues to pose problems. 2 Although it has developed extensive rights of participation in the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) it has encountered particular difficulties with recognition at the UN General Assembly, within UNEP, at the 'Rio plus' conferences and within the CSD. Alongside the complex internal structures of EU policy-making, the different ways in which the Union represents itself externally prompt questions about 'who speaks for the Union', the extent to which the Union has developed a coherent line on the reform of international environmental governance and the degree to which the EU is comparable to the other actors considered in this volume.
For the Member States, the great majority of environmental legislation now originates in the form of directives of the European Community. The latter has developed policy competencies, replacing those of the Member States, for areas as significant as atmospheric pollution, water quality, marine conservation and waste management. These alongside the environmental and conservation aspects of the common policies for commerce, agriculture and fisheries mean that the Community has a substantial policy responsibility for the content of most of the forty chapters of Agenda 21. assumption is made about the G77, but the EU is as different from the latter as it is from the state actors that also figure ( Vogler 1999 , Bretherton & Vogler, 2006 
The Rio Process
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio in 1992 was the first global showcase for the Union's emerging actorness. Whereas its predecessor, the UNCHE at Stockholm in1972, was influenced by the rudiments of European Community environmental policy, UNCED witnessed the emergence of the Community as a 'full participant' for the first time (Mensah 1996: 32) Despite the extensive degree of Community competence for the issues under discussion, the Commission had to negotiate hard for expanded recognition in advance of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to acquire speaking rights equivalent to those of state participants. Its achievement was memorialised in a footnote to Agenda 21 which stated that:
When the term governments is used, it will be deemed to include the European Economic Community within its areas of competence.
The other participants insisted that this should not create any form of legal precedent and have since made the status of the EC a matter of bargaining and persuasion in major UN fora. 1 It is worth remembering that UNCED was, at the time, the largest diplomatic gathering ever held and that there were inevitably underlying issues of status and recognition. Thus for Commission officials it was important that its president Jacques Delors was afforded equal treatment to other heads of government -including, of course, those of the Member States. Commissioner for Environment, Ripa de Meana, refused to attend UNCED after the failure to agree on a convention on forests and the concession on greenhouse gas emissions, opining that: 'We are not only not saving the earth; we are not even saving our own consciences' .
understanding on environment and development between North and South -"was always understood to be an expression of desire rather than reality". It surely was the strong desire of some within the EU, but the beginning economic downturn and internal resistance to the guiding norm of sustainable development undermined the Union's commitment -not only in financial terms.
Despite the difficulties encountered by the Europeans in this first appearance on the stage of global environmental governance, the overall outcome was a success -not so much for sustainable development but for the reputation of the EC. This was relative to the performance of the United States for whom the Rio proceedings were widely regarded as a diplomatic disaster. It is worthwhile to quote the views of a sceptical UK participant here, who compared the very different performances of the USA and the EC where the Member States:
"…many of which had problems similar to those identified by the Americans on such central issues as increased aid for the developing world, the deficiencies of the biodiversity convention, and high-cost action to tackle climate change, nevertheless managed to emerge from the process with their bridges to the rest of the world reinforced rather than undermined and their influence and standing enhanced rather than eroded" (Brenton, 1994: 234-5 ).
His explanation is interesting for it turns upon the relative insularity of the United States for whom policy has a domestic focus, by contrast:
The EC nations, by virtue of their size and proximity, are by now well adjusted and attuned to doing environmental business by international negotiation. They have learned to be attentive to international currents of opinion and to be ready to look for compromises to get an agreed result (ibid.:235).
Five years after Rio, states assembled once again at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in June 1997 (UNCED+5), but due to general distrust and lack of action on Agenda 21 and the North's financial commitment, the session turned into an often acrimonious, aptly termed "do-nothing event" (Agarwal et al. 2001: 198) . The EU reaffirmed its commitment to sustainable development and presented some new initiatives on water, energy, eco-efficiency and climate change. And, arguably again by default, it thus bolstered its status as the leader in international environmental affairs (Jordan and Voisey 1998: 97 Britain presented a toned-down version of the pragmatic and problem-solving approach that was also proffered by the USA. The UK position was designed to "address issues of wider concern" (ibid), highlighted the ideal of development, and favoured market-based instruments rather than simply pushing for environmental sustainability. "[W]e do not want institutional issues to dominate the Summit, distracting from achieving real action", it intoned (ibid.). A Europeanised version of this perspective won the day at Johannesburg because it was the least contentious, contained something positive for everyone, demonstrated some achievement, and could thus best survive the "difficult political backdrop" (Wallström 2002b ) of the summit.
Externally, the Union found itself with international negotiating parties that were either still distrustful of its objectives and credibility (G77 and China) or openly opposed to further institutional strengthening, financial commitments and principled language with normative implications (US and allied countries). The idea of a 'global deal' to reaffirm the 'spirit of Rio' and commit to action of a list of targets and timetables was thus seen as unattractive by either group. The US stance, in particular, had shifted over the previous years from obstructive passivity to principled opposition to many multilateral projects on the environment.
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The lack of international support underlined the central problem of many environmental negotiations -how to convince those parties who do not share the same priorities of the need for a comprehensive outcome package (Lightfoot and Burchell 2004: 341) . The fundamental differences with the US position made this a valiantly futile effort indeed, but arguably, the global South could have been courted more effectively. Instead, when attempts at revitalising the Rio discourse floundered, the EU channelled its energy into defending the language and commitments of sustainable development accumulated over the past decade of IEG (Lightfoot and Burchell 2005: 89) . This defensive posture may largely be blamed for the singular failure of addressing the topic of trade in any meaningful sense. The Doha Development Round, it appears, was on everyone's mind, but at the same time it remained curiously out of reach. In fact, as Bigg (2003) reports, due to US insistence on the primacy of the WTO, "there was a real danger that the message coming from Johannesburg would be that environmental policy should be subservient to economic policy". EU trade officials seemed to go along with this until the scheme ran into last-minute opposition from Ethiopia, Norway, and Switzerland (see Rosendal, this volume).
Despite this sobering assessment, it should also be recognised that defending the ideal of sustainable development against powerful contenders has been no small matter (Lightfoot and Burchell 2005: 89) , especially at a time when the global agenda revolves around the MDGs. Besides the global conferences, however, the EU has had other opportunities to make greater progress, for instance with regard to institutional reform of environmental governance.
In particular, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) offer fruitful material for further analysis of the Union's role.
Commission on Sustainable Development: towards a practical politics
Established in 1993, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) has a two-fold mission of continuous political dialogue and guidance for sustainable development policy.
This made for an ambitious agenda and underlined its official status as the forum for UNCED follow-up activities (Mensah 1996; Chasek, this volume) . The CSD's location under the ECOSOC umbrella should have perhaps given observers pause for thought. 1 Being one of its functional commissions and equipped with no real political authority, legal powers or proper financial resources proved to be a heavy burden on the fledgling CSD (Wagner 2005: 107) . It was, in other words, a doomed attempt to "maintain a high-profile leadership role on the Rio follow-up from a relatively low place in the institutional hierarchy" (Hyvarinen and Brack 2000: 25) .
This was either done on purpose or through a temporary suspension of political acumen. Rio's positive spirit and a belief in the ultimate persuasiveness of sustainable development would explain US Vice-President Gore's description of the CSD's purpose as "focusing attention on issues of common interest; serving as a forum for raising ideas an plans; helping resolve issues that arise as nations proceed in their sustainable development agendas; monitoring progress; and helping shift the multilateral financial institutions and bilateral assistance efforts towards a sustainable development agenda (Bigg and Dodds cited in Wagner 2005: 103) ."
This vision of consensual or at least cooperative problem-solving has not come to pass, for it underestimated the enormous political stakes inherent in the sustainable development agenda and the staying power of the North-South schism. 2 Instead, the CSD developed into "another UN talk shop" (Agarwal et al. 2001: 170) where language served not as the medium of 1 ECOSOC has for decades been on the sidelines of the UN system, even though it had originally been intended to be at the core of it -together with the General Assembly. 2 In 2001, a Southern delegate deplored that -after ten years of negotiation -delegates were still not able to agree on "a satisfactory definition of sustainable development" (ENB 2001-04: 12) . Given its notoriously ambiguous meaning and political usefulness, this should not have come as a surprise.
dialogue and understanding, but of normative posturing and legalistic defensiveness. This dynamic has only begun to change for the better after a CSD reform was agreed at Johannesburg.
The CSD posed another problem because it was an elective body in which not all the member States would be present. It took until the second session to resolve the issue of EC participation. This involved the granting of speaking rights, the rights to put propositions but not to vote on the understanding that there would be no increase in the representation to which Member States were already entitled (Mensah 1996: 32) . Of the 53 elected state members of the CSD, there have generally been eight or nine EU participants. France, Germany and the United Kingdom have been present at all the sessions up to date 1 , which shows that they have taken the new forum very seriously and aim to influence the EU position through their direct access to the discussions.
The Union only attained the status of 'full participant' (without the right to vote) in February 1995 and has traditionally relied on a 'lead-country' approach in the CSD (Vogler 2003: 66; Cameron 2004: 162) . This flexible arrangement means that the current Presidency of the European Council will articulate the common EU position while leaving specific issue-areas (e.g. freshwater) to particular member states who have accumulated expertise or a heightened interest in the matter. The result has been a broadly consistent and competent advocacy role of the Union. Many EU countries had been among the chief instigators of the CSD at UNCED and consequently, the EU position has often been proactive and forward-looking. The CSD bears the norm of sustainable development in its name and was hoped to become the primary 'watchdog' over its progressive integration into UN and affiliated institutional policies. After UNGASS 1997, the EU began to argue for a re-orientation of the CSD towards a more pragmatic, goal-oriented purpose -a plea that was shared by other delegations at Johannesburg and resulted in a noticeable institutional overhaul.
In 1994, when the CSD held its first genuine meetings, EU statements already revealed a certain 'practical' outlook, for instance when the Greek Presidency declared that "CSD decisions must be short and action-oriented and political impetus is vital" (ENB 1994).
Several months later, the German Presidency added that "the CSD needs dialogue instead of debate and an integrated approach to the inter-related questions of sustainable development" (ENB 1994 was gradually being reversed. EU initiatives on freshwater and energy that had stalled during the acrimonious rifts of 1997-98 became a realistic proposition and Northern countries in general began to look for the 'pragmatic' de-politicisation of the CSD which had been naively assumed, rather than devised, at its inception.
The Union has certainly cultivated what Wagner (2005: 112) has called a "driving strategy": having assiduously prepared its positions and alternative arguments before the meetings, the EU "often presents action proposals rather than solely responding to others'
suggestions." Under the guise of such forward-looking and often "problem-solving" proposals (Wagner 1999 ) the EU has sought to dominate the political agenda and direct the debate away from political principles towards the practical implementation of sustainable development.
Despite the sincere intentions behind this tactic, the strategic, political impact should not be underestimated. So successful was the Union's 'driving strategy' that, in a 2001 expert group on energy questions, several G77 delegates complained that the Chair's negotiating text mostly reflected "European perceptions of the energy issue" (ENB 2001b: 7) . This example demonstrates that the EU's desire for policy and norm diffusion was not only relatively influential, but also that it frequently collided with the wishes of watchful counterparts.
Overall, it is obvious that the attempts at indirect agenda-setting and de-politicisation were more successful than direct proposals for national regimes of implementation and UNEP's "peculiar dual mandate" (Imber 1993 : 58) of being both catalyser and coordinator has indeed been the source of persistent practical headaches. Its comparatively small budget (60 million US-Dollars in 2000) means that it cannot aspire to be a "delivery agency" (Dodds 2000: 294) , but has to rely on scientific fact-finding, persuasion, and advances in international environmental law. This catalytic role has been assumed with surprising success (Najam 2003) , although it does not measure up to the much greater European ambitions of creating a strengthened and more unified system of environmental governance. Nor is the lack of coordinative muscle a historical accident of ad hoc regime creation (Najam 2003: 372) With regard to the EU's plans for a strong environmental pillar in the UN system, there were only two positive options available (Imber 1993) . One would have been to redistribute the coordination mandate to other institutions and concentrate on the catalytic potential. This has actually happened to some extent, for the CSD and the Environment Management Group (EMG), set up in 1993 and 2001 respectively, have been entrusted with mainstreaming sustainable development and environmental aspects. The second option was to recast UNEP as a specialised agency with increased funding and strengthened authority. It is this latter objective which has now become the Union's official agenda for GEG. But between Imber's initial analysis in 1993 and EU's public commitment to a UNEO lay at least eleven years filled with a succession of institutional proposals and tactical moves.
The period between Rio and UNGASS in 1997 is today known as the 'dark hour' of UNEP as an organisation 1 . A number of states (including Germany, South Africa, Singapore, Brazil)
came to UNEP's rescue at the summit and proposed the creation of a World Environment Organisation (WEO) (Dodds 2000: 302) . However, neither had they sufficiently prepared their initiative, nor were most countries willing to contemplate the financial resources required for this reform. It was perhaps a brave proposition, but the timing could not have been much worse.
Only one year later, the UN Task Force on Environment and Development recommended the establishment of an 'Environment Management Group' (EMG) that would be chaired by UNEP's Executive Director and involve many other UN bodies and affiliated financial institutions (Hyvarinen and Brack 2000: 32) . Finally, in 2001, the EMG was indeed set up and charged with improving "UN system-wide inter-agency coordination related to specific issues in the field of environment and human settlements through a comprehensive series of measures designed to enhance coherent and coordinated action within the UN system in these areas" (EMG 2006) . The EU often expressed its "high hopes" for the EMG (EU Presidency Statement 2000, 2001a), regarding it as "a first step in the right direction" (Environment Council 2000) . After a few years, the realisation has set in that the EMG "has not met expectations, suffering from a relatively weak mandate and status" (EU Speaking Points 2006a).
2 1 Some observers argued that the UNCED mandate reaffirmed UNEP as the main environmental organisation and gave it more responsibilities than ever before (Timoshenko and Berman 1996: 45 ). Yet, whereas political attention focused on the newly created CSD and developing countries grew increasingly restless in the face of Northern refusal to honour financial promises, UNEP was additionally burdened by a wavering leadership. By the time of UNGASS, it had been labelled as largely irrelevant (ENB 1999: 11) . 2 However, like in the case of the CSD, the Union is not ready to discard this instrument. Seeing it as part of an overarching framework of GEG reform, a more powerful EMG, backed up with a mandate from the Global Session of the GC in April 2004, the case for a specialised agency (UNEO) was "deftly kept afloat by France in the margins of various meetings" (ENB 2004: 8) , it was already being discussed by a working group of interested countries (Lenzerini 2006; France-Diplomatie 2006) and was soon elevated to the status of a common EU reform proposal.
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At the same time, efforts were underway to hone the arguments in favour of universal membership. At an international round table organised by the German government and the think tank Ecologic, arguments for this particular reform were debated and improved.
Participants emphasised that a common view on GC membership was essential in order to "not allow divisions within the EU to weaken its position" and "prepare the EU to speak clearly and with one voice" at the upcoming meetings (Ecologic Round Table 2004 : 2-3).
2
The UNEO motion had become so attractive for EU policy-makers because it offered a compromise between the options of a moderately strengthened UNEP without much coordinative power and a fully-fledged WEO with all its problems of legitimacy and acceptability. A UNEO would represent an umbrella organisation for the numerous MEAs and it would thus achieve some much-needed rationalisation in GEG (Lenzerini 2006) . The institutional framework to address this need" (ibid: 17). It does, however, incorporate "respect for nature" in the section on principles and values and confirms sustainable development as "a key element of the overarching framework of United Nations activities", reproducing the language used in the JPI (Morgera 2006: 19 
Conclusion
The preceding analysis has established, albeit imprecisely, that the EU has exercised influence at least in the setting of agendas if not in delivery, although this may sometimes fall short of its self-proclaimed leadership role. This is consistent with its recent performance in other areas of global environmental governance, in the promotion of norms such as the precautionary principle and most significant of all, in the rescue of the Kyoto Protocol and the establishment of an international emissions trading system (Vogler 2005; Zito 2005 ).
There is a structural basis for EU influence as an actor which may be conceptualised in terms of its 'presence' in the international system. 1 That is to say the sheer scale of the Single Market and the range of EU internal policies will have a profound and sometimes magnetic effect upon outsiders, particularly those which are close trading and aid partners and are located within the European region. This creates expectations that the EU will act and also ensures that EU positions in multilateral forums will be followed by states who have, or wish to have, a 'membership perspective' and to a certain extent by the dependent ACP countries.
It is reinforced by the Union's commitment to multilateralism and its enthusiasm, as demonstrated in the range of countries contributing to ESDP operations. Since the 1980s, the In specific negotiations, internal unity is at first sight a critical precondition of 'actorness' and influence. European leadership, Marsh (2005: 157) argues, is "proportional to its internal unity" whose degree, in turn, can often be discerned through the mandate conferred by the European Council or by carefully reading the Presidency statements reflecting a common EU position. The implication here is that the major problem is one of persuading 27 Member States to take a consistent line. The sheer number and variety of Member States is, indeed, daunting and there are opportunities for outsiders to exert influence by proxy, for instance by relying on a sympathetic "Trojan horse" that largely shares their views (Rhinard and Kaeding 2005: 9) . The restricted membership of the CSD and UNEP Governing Council limits the numbers but there will always be the need for co-ordination meetings which mean that EU delegations have to get up early in advance of conference sessions and 'the Nordics have to get up even earlier' .(cross reference to Rosendal). 
I
The EU is in some ways comparable to a large federal state insofar as its external policy effectiveness may be compromised by internal 'incoherence'. During the WSSD, there certainly was a significant division between the EU sectors of trade and the environment which led to the ultimately unsuccessful attempt at subordinating MEAs to the WTO. And
Britain most likely worked behind the scenes to achieve a more 'pragmatic' result focused on flexible implementation mechanisms, which emphasised the role of private actors and publicprivate partnerships. Similarly, in the preparations for UNCED, a preoccupation with trade issues and the importance of the Uruguay Round over-rode environmental considerations.
There are still differences in the interpretation of sustainable development between the sectors of development and environment. As Opoku and Jordan (2005: 22) put it, "[t]he one language of sustainable development is in this case perhaps only thinly veiling two still separate cultures."
To be a credible leader -in the eyes of the developing world in particular -the Union has to get its internal policies right and create linkages with a coherent set of external policies.
Those carrying the message of environmental protection and sustainable development onto the global stage should be able to show how they themselves have realised this project at home (Wallström 2002a; Solbes 2001) . Secondly, the EU's external policy should reflect its international commitments, ranging from a long-standing aim to increase ODA to the impact of its trade or agricultural policies. It is critical here that the EU position is not seen in terms of "double standards", "neo-colonialism" or otherwise primarily self-interested strategy (Morgera and Duran 2006: 21) . A year after the WSSD, Commissioner Wallström (2003) with her memory of negotiations still fresh -repeatedly stressed that her priority was "policy coherence between external commitments and internal policies."
In a sense, the analysis of the Union's deficiencies has thus come full circle by referring us back to its internal policy-making. Achieving the coherence Wallström demands would necessitate the creation of a relative harmony of purpose within the EU. But the constant compromises, corrections and even turn-arounds (e.g. with regard to ODA) undertaken to continue the at least tripartite mission of economic competitiveness, agricultural preservation and sustainable development result in a serious "role ambiguity" and "perceived inconsistency" (Chaban et al. 2006: 254) that saps the incipient credibility. And while there can often be large differences in framing environmental issues between the various Council formations, it is the European Council which is charged with synthesising these positions.
Taking account of the various agendas, it seeks to reassure everyone around the table, which tends to produce an often ambivalent negotiation mandate.
Consequently, our observations of EU influence in process of GEG reform are less the result of immaculate European strategising, unity of purpose or its powers of persuasion.
Perseverant and intelligent agenda-setting may have played as much a role as contextual factors like the absence of serious competition. By putting forward principles and norms like sustainable development and precaution and by insisting on institutional movement towards more coherence, authority and coordination, the EU is often "able to define the international problem and provide a plausible solution early enough in the process to gain the advantage over other actors" (Zito 2005: 372) . And when the Union comes up against more proactive opposition -such as the attempts to renegotiate parts of Agenda 21 at Johannesburg -it generally proves itself to be a formidable blocking power, which is undoubtedly helped by its lack of negotiating flexibility arising from problems of co-ordination once the mandate has been defined.
Leadership, regardless of how precisely it is created and sustained, does of course not always equal real influence. The latter's litmus test is perhaps rather the transition of other actors to different values (Lightfoot and Burchell 2005: 87) or a marked "redistribution of values" that Sjöstedt et al. (2005: 300) failed to find with regard to the historical record of GEG. On the other hand, there are also some signs that the Union's tenacity in fine-tuning tactics and arguments may finally be paying off. At the 2006 annual UNEP meeting, some observers felt that the principled opposition of important countries, such as Japan and China, to a UNEO may be weakening (ENB 2006: 14; Rosendal, this volume) . Perhaps this also demonstrates that the often inflexible negotiating performance of the EU and the complex status of its actorness are not among its major deficiencies. Credibility and coherence should be the objectives for a stronger, more effective Union on the international stage. Much harder to 'fix' than organisational or strategic aspects, they arguably represent the real challenge for the EU in today's global environmental governance.
